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Abstract
I present a unified discussion of several recently published results concerning the escalation,
timing and severity of violent events in human conflicts and global terrorism, and set them in
the wider context of real-world and cyber-based collective violence and illicit activity. I point
out how the borders distinguishing between such activities are becoming increasingly blurred
in practice – from insurgency, terrorism, criminal gangs and cyberwars, through to the 2011
Arab Spring uprisings and London riots. I review the robust empirical patterns that have been
found, and summarize a minimal mechanistic model which can explain these patterns. I also
explain why this mechanistic approach, which is inspired by non-equilibrium statistical physics,
fits naturally within the framework of recent ideas within the social science literature concerning
analytical sociology. In passing, I flag the fundamental flaws in each of the recent critiques which
have surfaced concerning the robustness of these results and the realism of the underlying model
mechanisms.
Working paper to accompany an upcoming seminar discussion. The paper will be updated sporad-
ically as the research program to quantify and model collective human predation in real-world and
cyberspace systems evolves.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
10
9.
20
76
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  9
 Se
p 2
01
1
I. THE COMPLEX SPATIOTEMPORAL DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT
Irrespective of its origin, any given conflict or terrorist campaign will play out as a highly
complex dynamical system driven by interconnected actors whose actions are driven by a
wide variety of evolving information sources, myriad socioeconomic, cultural and behavioral
cues, and multiple feedback processes. Furthermore, since conflicts and campaigns have a
beginning and eventually an end, they will by definition exhibit non-steady state, out-of-
equilibrium dynamics. To see the complications that can arise from the inherent feedback
and nontrivial temporal evolution characteristic of such complexity, one does not necessarily
have to limit consideration to the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, or recent global
terror campaigns. In the current year alone (i.e. 2011) three examples have arisen in which
a loose, quasi-coherent coordination between collections of humans has given rise to violent
events in response to news or rumors circulating on the Internet or electronic messaging
between participants: The Arab Spring uprising, the London riots in the United Kingdom,
and the high profile cyber-attacks on government and commercial sites by secretive hacker
groups such as LulzSec. Indeed, the mixing of events in real and cyber space, together
with the fueling of illicit activities by the drug trade and international crime, has led to a
blurring of the boundaries between terrorism, insurgency, war, so-called organized crime,
and common delinquency. For example, there is a clear and present threat to the U.S.
from Mexico as a result of the combination of such activities: On September 2010, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, said that
the violence by the DTOs (Drug Trafficking Organizations) in Mexico may be “morphing
into, or making common cause with, what we would call an insurgency” [1]. The United
Nations, in its report titled “The Globalization of crime: A transnational organized crime
threat assessment” [2], cites a statement by the UN Security Council from February 2010
in which they highlight “.. the serious threat posed in some cases by drug trafficking and
transnational organized crime to international security in different regions of the world”.
This report also states that a major stability threat will arise in the future as cartels and
gangs fight for control of territory, and that the impact will be increasing violence among
criminals and toward state officials and the public. In short, there will be more likelihood of
spillover violence, more corruption, increasing loss of territorial control, and an accelerated
undermining of both the social fabric and homeland security for nation states.
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Interrelated to the situation in Mexico, is that of Colombia, where a thirty-plus year war
still continues. Though Marxist in origin, its character has been mixed up by the narcotraffic
industry, criminal gangs, mafia cartels, paramilitary groups, the presence of at least two
major guerilla organizations (FARC and ELN), and widespread common delinquency driven
by a variety of socioeconomic factors [3]. As such, the struggle faced by state organizations to
counteradapt to ever-changing guerilla-narco-crime-cartel innovations, is immense. Quoting
Ref. [3], President Santos recently outlined new tactics to counteradapt to the guerrillas
adoption of (i) hit-and-run raids using flexible units, (ii) mixing of rebels and criminal gangs
and their use of joint activities as mutual needs arise, for example so-called Bacrims which
are organized criminal bands, (iii) dressing of insurgents as civilians to merge into the general
population, (iv) carrying out small-scale attacks for maximum attention but little risk to
themselves. In response to the dynamical and fragmented nature of the insurgent cells which
threaten the government’s control on law and order, the state’s new tactics include more
flexible units in order to mirror more closely the insurgents’ behaviors: “We have to adjust
our doctrine, our operations and our procedures to the way (the rebels) are operating”
(President Juan Manuel Santos [3]). These features (i)-(iv) of an insurgent Red force are
not unique to Colombia – they reflect the behaviors likely adopted by any armed group on
the Red side that is fighting to survive, whether it operate in real space or in the cyberworld,
or some future hybrid mix of the two [4–6]. For this reason, these properties (i)-(iv) will
play a core mechanistic role in the generic model presented in this paper. Indeed there is
an entirely parallel threat to real-space insurgencies and terrorism which is evolving on the
Internet, in terms of transnational attacks in the cyber domain from both sovereign state
and non-state actors. This threat is arguably even more urgent than the real-space one,
given that cyber ‘weapons’ (e.g. encounter-network worms or bots) can be assembled very
quickly, and transported in principle at the speed of light (i.e. via communications limits
within fiber-optic networks). The advantage for Red (i.e. an insurgent or illicit organization)
is that these cyber-logistics are much easier, quicker, and naturally more clandestine than
the physical task of having to transport weapons and/or people from a point of assembly to
the place of potential attack.
Future predatory threats in real and/or cyberspace, are likely to adapt to, and exploit, the
rapid, ongoing advances in global connectivity, and hence present clear but evolving dangers
to each and every nation state, corporation or legitimate organization. The resulting arms-
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race between adaptation-counteradaptation by Red and Blue (i.e. state organizations) will
likely lead to rapid innovation of new predation methods. In addition, the background
civilian population, refereed to here as Green, cannot be considered as purely passive –
instead, it is a three-way struggle between Red, Blue and Green. Given this complexity, the
possibility for rapid escalation of hybrid real-world attacks, cyber attacks, and cyber-assisted
attacks, therefore represents an unprecedented future risk which needs to be understood,
quantified, mitigated and controlled – or at least delayed or deflated in terms of its potential
impact. But there are so many questions that need addressing: How are these national and
international threats likely to evolve going forward? Given their finite resources, how can
state agencies and countries be best prepared to face this challenge? What can be done
in advance to prepare for the next generation of cyber–real-space attacks? Are there any
likely points of intervention that can be usefully exploited? Without quantitative models
of such situations, solutions must be sought purely on the basis of narratives and case-
studies (assuming any are available). It is clear that such narratives and case studies could
play a crucial role, in particular where very few prior examples are known, or where strong
socioeconomic, cultural or behavioral factors play a key role. But as the amount of available
data from such attacks, both in the real world and cyber world, increases, is there anything
additional that can be said from a statistical viewpoint? In particular, given that human
conflicts and terror campaigns are examples of a highly complex dynamical system driven
by interconnected issues and actors, is this a potentially fruitful topic for analysis within
the framework of the statistical physics of non-equilibrium open systems? And might such a
study then in turn shed valuable empirical light back on the emerging field of non-equilibrium
statistical physics?
In this paper, I review some recent steps taken in this direction by our collaborative
team. The results in many ways build upon earlier works within the statistical physics
community, e.g. Redner [7] and Rodgers [8] among others [9–17], going all the way back
to the mid-20th century work of Lewis Fry Richardson [18] and Frederick Lanchester [19].
In particular, we pursue a methodology which complements that of the political, social
and life science fields [4–6, 20–64], but which mirrors the approach initiated within the
statistical physics community in association with the study of financial markets [65–68].
Our methodological program follows these steps: (1) Use state-of-the-art spatiotemporal
datasets with the highest available resolution, combined with current narratives from the
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academic literature, online sources, and the broader national and international media, in
order to identify systematic and anomalous behaviors in the ongoing timelines of daily,
weekly and monthly events within a given domain of human predation. (2) Quantify the
resulting stylized statistical facts of these multi-component time-series and hence identify
statistically significant deviations or anomalies. (3) Carry out a parallel procedure for other
predation domains (e.g. provinces, or countries, or cultures) identifying where and when
similar stylized facts emerge and, by contrast, where anomalies arise. (4) Develop a multi-
agent mechanistic model of the underlying multi-actor dynamics for the domains of interest.
Then undertake an iterative process of model modification and comparison to the data
in order to obtain a minimal mechanistic model which is consistent with the most robust
stylized facts which have been extracted from the data.
The individual works which I summarize here using a unified perspective, have ap-
peared separately in a range of different specialized journals [69–88] following our two initial
preprints [89, 90] in which we presented an initial coalescence-fragmentation model and an
initial analysis of the empirical data for the severity of events. Many others have presented
excellent complementary or related works [7, 8, 12, 91], but I do not discuss these works
here or give a comprehensive review. Despite this progress, much remains to be done. In
particular, our ongoing projects are focused around connecting the above listed works to the
wider body of research activity within the human social, cultural and behavioral domain
[41–64]. Examples that we are pursuing include adapting the model from step (4) above, to
incorporate the results from studies from social psychology [92], economics, social science
and crime science [99]. These results from other fields, while quantitative, may not be in the
form of high frequency time-series, the preferred choice of the statistical physics community
[67] – hence their incorporation represents a challenge to the statistical physics modeling
process. However their inclusion is essential in order for such mechanistic analysis to be
taken seriously by the other communities studying collective human predation. We are also
actively probing time-series anomalies (e.g. see Red Queen discussion below) and interpret-
ing them in terms of actor decisions, adaptations and counteradaptations. We are also using
the multi-agent model to interpret how the underlying armed actors are themselves adapt-
ing their strategies, changing their membership and reach, and counteradapting to current
government and agency procedures. In parallel to earlier work in econophysics, we can then
run these scientific models forward in time in to order to develop realistic prediction corri-
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dors for where each of the indicators are likely to evolve and hence how the future threat
is likely to change [85, 86]. This will allow us to change features in the parameter space
of the models, in order to test out scenarios and identify points in the future evolution at
which interventions might be possible, or necessary, in order to avoid particular undesirable
outcomes [85, 86].
Even the simple cartoon representation in Fig. 1 demonstrates that at any one timestep,
the complexity of the actors and their interactions can create a formidably complicated
dynamical system. For studies of fatalities, the observable output xi(t) can be considered
a vector whose elements describe the number of fatalities for each population type (i.e.
Red, Blue, Green) at place i at timestep t. More generally, the output xi(t) would be a
tensor, showing separately the numbers of victims killed and wounded, and the different
weapon types used (e.g. Improvised Explosive Device (IED), or suicide bomb, or rocket
propelled grenade (RPG), or small arms fire). For simplicity, we will tend to refer to the
‘Red’ population as ‘insurgent’, even though they may be a heterogeneous collection of
cyber-gangs, drug cartels, idealistic insurgents, rebels or rioters, and we refer to ‘Blue’ as
the ‘coalition military’ or ‘official antiterrorist organization’ even though they may be cyber-
defense, police, security forces etc. Setting aside the issue of whether the data recorded has
an observational bias or not due to the way it was recorded (e.g. main street bias [83, 84]),
there are many other potential complications facing a data-driven research program such as
ours. These include, but are not limited to, the following: (i) Heterogeneity of the insurgent
force strength (i.e. Red) which is depicted in Fig. 1 as various ‘types’ of fighter, or weapons,
or assets including financing. This could also include different cultural, social and behavioral
types within Red. Even the assumption that there is just one Red force can be misleading,
as evidenced currently in Colombia (ELN, and FARC) and in Libya, with the different rebel
factions. It is not just an ‘us and them’ situation. (ii) Heterogeneity of Blue, comprising
warfighters, equipment and money. (iii) Heterogeneity of Green, the background civilian
population, in terms of tribal or ethnic groups. (iv) The non-passive nature of Green due
to possible influence, sympathy, or direct recruitment to Red. For example in Fig. 1, active
support of Red is indicated by two green figures with red heads who then get converted
in the next timestep to Red. Or it could simply be that a Green member shows an active
failure to support Blue. (v) Changing number of Red members, or Red cells. (vi) Finite
lifetime of any given Red cell due to endogenous or exogenous factors, such as its implicit
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic of the complex spatiotemporal dynamics of multi-actor collective
predation in real and/or cyber space. The result is a complex ecology of interactions and ob-
served events, driven by some dynamically evolving but hidden network of loosely connected Red
cells featuring non-local interactions aided by electronic communications [70, 89, 90]. At any one
time, there may be multiple types of actor, and these may cross different cultural and behavioral
boundaries. Each population is partitioned into loose temporal cells [3–6]. Each cell may itself
sporadically combine with another cell, or simply fragment in some way – for example, as a result of
sensing danger [4–6, 16, 17, 40]. In addition to the traditional Blue population (e.g. state military,
terrorist group or intelligence organization) and Red (e.g. insurgency or hacker group), there is
also a background civilian population which is labelled as Green, but which may not be passive in
the struggle. Social, cultural and human behavioral factors may play an important role for Green
and Red at the level of individual cells and its members.
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fragility in the presence of Blue or when perceiving imminent detection or capture. The
grouping dynamics that occur within and between insurgent and terrorist cells, and other
illicit group activities, are unlikely to be of the form seen in more open social settings. As
stated by Diego Gambetta in his influential book ‘Codes of the Underworld’, on p. 5. ,
“.... contrary to widespread belief, criminal groups are unstable [4]. In the underworld,
people have a higher rate of mobility (and mortality) than most professions.” This is also
supported in the case of insurgencies by accounts such as by Robb and Kenney [5, 6]. Such
fragmentation under danger is also entirely consistent with observed antipredator defenses in
birds and mammals [17, 40]. (vii) Decisions by Red cells to attack are not made in isolation,
nor are they irrespective of the past. Instead there is a complex, possibly unknowable, mix
of past events which affect a given cell or its members in particular ways – just as it does in
the non-violent world of collective human struggles, e.g. financial market predatory trading
[68, 93]. In addition there is the convoluted effect that current and past exogenous and
endogenous events and news might have, as is also known from the predatory environment
of financial markets [79]. These reactions to past and present events will also likely depend
nonlinearly on social, cultural and behavioral factors. (viii) The nature of the observable
events themselves: Even if they are accurately recorded, complete information will never
be known precisely about who did what and why. For these reasons, the challenges facing
anyone such as ourselves who wishes to analyze high-resolution spatiotemporal datasets
recording the results of collective human violence, and then look for common stylized facts,
and then finally build minimal mechanistic models, are highly nontrivial. Indeed, the fact
that more detailed spatiotemporal data is now becoming available, often down to the daily
scale within individual provinces or districts, means that the bar has been raised in terms
of what a model needs to achieve in order to be considered ‘consistent’ with the data.
It is only recently that detailed attempts to compare mechanistic conflict models to
datasets of day-to-day casualties, have appeared in the academic literature. This is in large
part due to the fact that large, high-frequency datasets have only recently become available
beyond confidential military circles, e.g. www.icasualties.org which gives coalition casualties
in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, theoretical attempts to model human conflict mathemat-
ically have had a long history. They tend to break down into one of two extremes: Models
which resemble chemical reactions, either in the form of continuous differential equations
(e.g. Lanchester [19, 94–97]), and computationally intensive individual-based models on
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some kind of fixed grid such as a checker-board or static spatial network [91]. In contrast
to the situation many decades or centuries ago, however, there are a number of additional
complicating factors: First, the classic image of a battle being fought between two well-
regimented armies lining up at dawn on opposite sides of a field or plain, does not describe
the fragmented, fluid situation of modern insurgencies [4–6], either in the real or cyber
worlds. Second, broadcasting communications now exist in which events and images can
be portrayed almost instantly to a broad sector of the global population, thereby possibly
influencing the decisions of their elected leaders and respective security forces. Third, per-
sonal media resources such as Twitter and Facebook, together with texts and emails, mean
that fighters (and potential fighters) who are separated across different streets, or towns,
or countries, or continents, can be connected together within a second – and hence they
can coordinate their actions such that they begin to behave as one quasi-coherent group
(or ‘cell’), even though they may never have met each other and may even be on different
continents. It can also happen that the members of such a cell – who may not be physically
connected, but whose actions are somehow coordinated through the use of technology –
suddenly lose their collective coherence (e.g. loss of communications, or loss of trust) and
hence the cell has effectively fragmented. At the touch of a keystroke or press of a button
on a cellphone keyboard, they instantaneously disappear into the background noise gener-
ated by everyday human activities. Fourth, the distinction between an insurgent or terrorist
(i.e. Red) and the background civilian population (i.e. Green) can be blurred and itself
highly fluid. It is no longer the case that a civilian population can be considered some inert
background which simply soaks up the violent events as they play out. We note that in
addition to such mechanistic descriptions, the literature also contains statistical studies of
total casualty count distributions inspired by the work of Richardson [18]. For example, we
[70, 89, 90] have analyzed the distribution of events in insurgent wars and terrorism, while
others have looked at terrorism [104].
Our own approach to modeling focuses on the underlying ecology, by representing the
various actors as interacting populations of heterogenous agents who operate with covert but
dynamically evolving communication networks, and who adapt their strategies in response
to external events and news, as well as counteradaptation by the relevant state authorities.
Our overall vision of the complex global interaction between gangs, cartels, illicit crime
groups etc. is therefore that of a complex ecology whose dynamics and internal interactions
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may change and adapt over time, with heterogeneous actors, interactions over space and
time, adaptation-counteradaptation, feedback, and movement or communication via some
underlying dynamical network. This view is in accordance with the state-of-the-art view of
modern violent gangs proposed by Felson [99], and the descriptions of Kilcullen, Robb and
Kenney [4–6]. Our mechanistic methodology is also entirely consistent with the analytical
sociology viewpoint which is current in the social sciences [100]. Adopting this viewpoint, we
have managed to uncover common patterns in insurgent wars and global terrorism [69, 70],
as well as a mechanistic relationship with the dynamics of street gangs and online guilds in
massively multiplayer online cyberwar games [75]. In addition to numerical results, we have
been able to obtain quantitative insight through the development of mathematical analysis
which reproduces the main features of these numerical and statistical results [72–74, 76]. Our
explanation for the existence of these common features, is simply that there are common ways
in which humans ‘do’ groups and group activities – just as traffic jams can exhibit common
statistical and dynamical properties in major cities around the world, and stock markets
exhibit common stylized statistical facts and dynamics [65, 66, 68]. As discussed later in
reference to Fig. 8, our model of collective human predation is consistent with several recent
hypotheses concerning modern insurgency [5, 20], is robust to many generalizations [73, 76],
and establishes a quantitative connection between human insurgency, global terrorism and
ecology. Its similarity to financial market models[8, 9] provides a surprising link between
violent and non-violent forms of human behavior. At the operational level, our findings have
a number of implications – for example, the clustering dynamics imply that operational cells
on the ground effectively have no permanent hierarchy or leaders. Our work also allows us to
explore ‘what if?’ scenarios in search of black swan behaviors and beyond. Our data sources
are real-time media databases, official (government and non-governmental organization)
reports, and academic studies. The individual papers referenced provide full details.
Before proceeding, we note that there is a possible confusion in terms of terminology
regarding what to call clusters of insurgents etc. Just as any other social setting, a small
cluster of people may be called a group, a team, a cell – likewise a larger cluster may also
be called a group, a crowd, or even an organization. Similarly, terrorists and insurgencies
are sometimes referred to as ‘groups’ even though this could be the entire entity (e.g. all
members of the FARC and their infrastructure) or just a few members who happened to be
together on a particular attack. In order to avoid a misunderstanding of what constitutes
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a group, a cell, and an organization, we will try to adopt the language in which a cell
is a cluster of a few Red agents (e.g. insurgents) which carries out a given attack, and
organization is the entire Red outfit – even though we stress that we do not want to assign
any specific organizational capabilities, or assume that Red is necessarily well organized, or
following a hierarchy. Indeed, as we will show, one of the implications of our work is that
the cells are loose and transient in terms of their operational activity. This is one of the
reasons they are probably so hard to track, in both real and cyber space.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Though inspired by work in non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, it turns out that our
mechanistic approach is remarkably consistent with current thinking in the social sciences
in particular, analytical sociology as developed by Hedstrom [100]. In particular, Hedstrom
states [100] “The basic idea of a mechanism-based explanation is quite simple: At its core,
it implies that proper explanations should detail the cogs and wheels of the causal process
through which the outcome to be explained was brought about.. Mechanisms consist of
entities (with their properties) and the activities that these entities engage in, either by
themselves or in concert with other entities. These activities bring about change, and the
type of change brought about depends on the properties of the entities and how the entities
are organized spatially and temporally.” Hedstrom goes on to state that the “key challenge is
to account for collective phenomena that are not definable by reference to any single member
of the collectivity. Among such properties are 1. Typical actions, beliefs, or desires among
the members of society or a collectivity. 2. Distributions and aggregate patterns such as
spatial distributions and inequalities. 3. Topologies of networks that describe relationships
between members of a collectivity. 4. Informal rules or social norms that constrain the
actions of the members of a collectivity.” Paraphrasing Hedstrom [100], a basic point of
the mechanism perspective is that explanations that simply relate macro-properties to each
other are unsatisfactory. He goes on to state that these explanations do not specify the
causal mechanisms by which macro-properties are related to each other. It seems that
deeper explanatory understanding requires opening up the black box and finding the causal
mechanisms that have generated the macro-level observation [100]. According to Hedstrom,
social mechanisms and mechanism-based explanations have, over the past decade, received
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considerable attention in the social sciences as well as in the philosophy of science. As also
stated by Hedstrom, some writers have described this as a mechanism movement that is
sweeping the social sciences [101]. He gives the example of a car’s engine whose mechanisms
and parts are quite visible when the hood is opened [100]. Hedstrom also states that “when
one appeals to mechanisms to make sense of statistical associations, one is referring to
things that are not visible in the data, but this is different from them being unobservable in
principle”.
Predator-prey systems have themselves been widely studied by many disciplines, includ-
ing physics [11]. Outside the few-particle limit, mean-field mass action equations such as
Lotka-Volterra can provide a fair description of the average and steady-state behavior, i.e.
dNR(t)/dt = f(NR(t), NB(t)) and dNB(t)/dt = g(NR(t), NB(t)) where NR(t) and NB(t)
are the Red and Blue population’s strength at time t. However, such population-level
descriptions of living systems do not explicitly account for the well-known phenomenon of
intra-population group (e.g. cluster) formation [40], leading to intense debate concerning the
best choice of functional response terms for f(NR(t), NB(t)) and g(NR(t), NB(t)) in order to
partially mimic such effects. Analogous mass-action equations have been used to model the
interesting non-equilibrium process of attrition (i.e. reduction in population size) as a result
of competition or conflict between two predator populations in colonies of ants, chimpanzees,
birds, Internet worms, commercial companies and humans in the absence of replenishment.
The term attrition just means that ‘beaten’ objects become inert (i.e. they stop being in-
volved), not that they are necessarily destroyed. The combined effects of intra-population
grouping dynamics and inter-population attrition dynamics have received surprisingly little
attention [7, 40], despite the fact that grouping and attrition are so widespread [40] and
the fact that their coexisting dynamics generate an intriguing non-equilibrium many body
problem.
III. ESCALATION: PROGRESS CURVES AND THE DYNAMICAL RED QUEEN
MODEL
Before moving on to discuss specific mechanistic interactions at the level of individual
cells, and hence necessarily introducing some assumptions concerning how they operate, I
will start by taking a broad-brush view of the overall arms-race struggle between Red and
12
Blue. This work is given in detail in Ref. [69].
We consider Red (e.g. insurgents) as continually wishing to damage Blue (e.g. kill
coalition military). All other things being equal, Red would like to complete successful
attacks as quickly as possible so that successive successful attacks become more frequent.
Using coalition military fatality data for Afghanistan, we therefore analyzed the times for
successive fatal days for the coalition military, and find that they follow an approximate
power-law progress curve τn = τ1n
−b [69]. Here τn is the time between the (n − 1)th and
nth fatal day, τ1 is the time between the first two fatal days, and b controls the escalation
process. A fatal day is one in which the insurgent activity produces at least one death. In
particular, we calculated the best-fit power-law progress curve parameters b and τ1 for each
province. Figure 2 shows a remarkable linear relationship which then emerges between these
best-fit progress curve values for different provinces. Examples of the best-fit progress curves
are given in Fig. 3. This result extends to a specific weapon type (i.e. fatalities caused by
improvised explosive devices (IEDs)) and to the separate insurgent conflict in Iraq as well
as terrorist activity [69] and suggest that the insurgent (and terrorist) production process is
very similar in nature across geographical boundaries and borders. It is quite possible that
similar results will also be found in the future for cyberattacks. In the context of a Red-Blue
struggle where Red’s task of damaging the coalition military effectively resists completion
(i.e. Blue is continually fighting back), the observed decrease in completion time may be due
to something Red is learning or doing, or Red’s increased manpower, or something Blue is
learning or doing (or not doing) or a decrease in Blue’s manpower – indeed there are myriad
possibilities. The suggestion of Ref. [102] that our progress curve analysis [69] is necessarily
tied to insurgent learning or experience, is false.
To explain the numbers appearing in Fig. 2, in particular the observed range of b values,
we have developed a dynamical version of the Red Queen evolutionary race [69] as shown
schematically in Fig. 4. In essence, the theory treats the relative advantage or lead, R,
of Red over Blue as a stochastic process – and hence the exponents b are given by the
scaling exponent for the standard deviation of the size of R’s (possibly correlated) random
walk [69]. Using this model, we can interpret the entire spectrum of observed b values
for different provinces, and also different terrorism domains, in an intuitive and unified
way. Most importantly, this broad-brush Red Queen-Blue King theory does not require
knowledge of specific adaptation or counter-adaptation mechanisms, and hence bypasses
13
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Robust linear relationship between the escalation parameters for different
provinces in Afghanistan shown as blue squares (from Ref. [69]). Also shown (red square) is a
corresponding result for Hezbollah activity (Ref. [69]). In contrast to the claim in Footnote 13 of
Ref. [102], the linear relationship is real, and does not result from the resolution of events on the
daily scale: 14 out of the 16 provinces have either zero, one or just two τn = 1 values. For the two
provinces with most τn = 1 values, Helmand and Kandahar, we demonstrate the robustness by
reducing nmax (see Fig. 3) such that the amount of piling up of τn = 1 events is reduced toward
zero. There is no qualitative effect on the linear relationship. The green arrow shows that their
datapoints undergo a simple to-and-fro variation along the line as nmax is reduced (Helmand is
light green, Kandahar is dark green). For Kandahar, for example, as nmax is reduced from the
summer 2010 value of 132 down to nmax = 24, for example, the values of b and τ1 simply move back
and forth in parallel with the line, and at nmax = 24 the datapoint ends up with almost exactly the
same values as for nmax = 132. For Helmand, we show values down to nmax = 29 as an example,
as compared to the actual value of 278. For the remaining provinces, removing the very few τn = 1
values that occur also leaves the linear relationship unchanged. Several provinces have no τn = 1
values, hence the data-resolution criticism is a priori completely irrelevant.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Successive time intervals τn between fatal days, i.e. days in which coalition
fatalities are generated by hostile activities, for the Afghanistan province of (a) Southern border
region and (b) Kandahar. On this log-log plot, the best-fit power-law progress curve is by definition
a straight (blue) line with slope −b (where b controls the escalation rate). In (a), as in all the
provinces other than Helmand and Kandahar, there are either no τn = 1 values, or just one or two.
issues such as changes in insurgent membership (i.e. composition, numbers or numbers of
cells), technology, learning or skill-set, as well as removing any need to know the hearts
and minds of local residents. Historically, the Red Queen story features the Red Queen
(e.g. insurgency or terrorist group) running as fast as she can just to stay at the same
place, implying that her Blue King opponent (e.g. state security force or antiterrorism
organization) instantaneously and perfectly counter-adapts to her advances such that they
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are always neck and neck. However, such instantaneous and perfect counter-adaptation
is unrealistic – indeed, the complex adaptation-counteradaptation dynamics generated by
sporadic changes in circumstances imply that the temporal evolution is likely be so complex
that it can indeed be modelled as a stochastic process. We do not need to know exactly why
R changes at any specific moment, nor do the changes in R have to have the same value
since each change is the net result of a mix of factors (e.g. changes in numbers of personnel,
technology, learning or experience) for each opponent. We also find that a similar picture
to Fig. 2, showing a similarly remarkable inter-relationship between individual provinces,
arises in other situations where an arms-race struggle is underway – for example, for suicide
bombings in individual provinces in Pakistan (not shown) [106]. In all these cases, we stress
that a change in Red’s lead R might result from a conscious or unconscious adaptation by
Red, or by Blue, or both – for example, there may be an increase in Red numbers because
of a conscious recruitment campaign or simply due to bad press involving Blue’s activity.
Likewise R may change due to a surge in Blue’s numbers or strength, or a change in its
tactics or defenses. It does not matter: The precise cause for changes in R does not affect
the validity of our theory.
In contrast to the claim of Ref. [102], the linear relationships that we uncover in Ref.
[69] and Fig. 2 are real and do not result from any bias due to the resolution of events
on the daily scale. Of all the provinces, only Helmand and Kandahar reach an escalation
such that events eventually occur on the daily scale. To verify the robustness of our linear
relationship, we therefore reduce nmax (see Fig. 3) such that the piling up of τn = 1 events
is progressively reduced toward zero. This is equivalent to asking what the progress curve
is up to some date prior to our end-date of summer 2010 [69]. As shown in Fig. 2, this
has no qualitative effect on the linear relationship – see the green arrow which indicates the
resulting to-and-fro variations of the datapoints for Helmand and Kandahar along the line
as nmax is reduced. The other provinces have very few, if any, τn = 1 values. Of the 16
provinces which define the linear relationship in Fig. 1 of Ref. [69], 14 have two or less
τn = 1 values, and none of these are piled up in a way that would induce a correlation
between their best-fit b and τ1 values. Moreover, as can be checked from media and online
reports, the τn = 1 values that do occur in these 14 provinces can typically be tied to real,
separate events on consecutive days, i.e. their one-day separation value (τn = 1) is real
and has nothing to do with data resolution. However for the academic purpose of fully
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rebutting the claim of Ref. [102], we have gone through the checking exercise of removing
these τn = 1 values in order to test the robustness of the linear relationship between b and
τ1. As the low incidence of τn = 1 values would suggest, these 14 blue squares follow the
linear relationship shown in Fig. 2, and hence also in Ref. [69], both with and without
the inclusion of these one or two τn = 1 values. Going further, Zabul, Wardak, Khowst
and the Southern border region have no τn = 1 values and hence this issue is irrelevant to
them. Indeed, the fact that these four provinces’ best-fit (b, τ1) values are widely separated
along the linear trendline, means that this linear trend is already well-defined by these four
provinces alone. The Hezbollah datapoint (Fig. 2, red) also has no τn = 1 values and hence
there is again no data resolution issue. Even for the organization-wide global terrorist data
of Ref. [102], we deduced our best-fit estimates in Fig. 2 of Ref. [69] using the escalation
range within which τn = 1 values were hardly involved (we analyzed the initial escalation in
Fig. 2(a) of Ref. [102]). In short, the claim in Footnote 13 of Ref. [102] that our results are
driven by data resolution, is completely false.
We now make a more general point about the recent preprint Ref. [102] in relation to our
own paper which was published several weeks earlier (Ref. [69]). As stated in its title, our
paper focuses exclusively on the escalation regime of fatal attacks against coalition military
within individual provinces. The approach in Ref. [102] aggregates over entire organizations,
and hence has the potential to produce significant piling-up effects (i.e. densely packed
τn = 1 values) since the likelihood of a fatal attack happening on a given day somewhere
across an entire country or global organization becomes far more likely. Reference [102]
treats the resulting regimes of dense τn = 1 datapoints in an approximate ansatz-driven
manner. However this approach [102] has several drawbacks. First, it is actually dangerous
to attach too much importance to any regime where τn = 1 values regularly occur (which
we stress is not the case for our data). A single attack can extend over two days, as has
tended to happen in the past decade with the FARC for example in Colombia. However
it may erroneously recorded in a terrorism or conflict database as two events separated by
τn = 1. By focusing solely on the escalation period where τn = 1 events are rare, our paper
minimizes this problem, but Ref. [102]’s aggregate approach does not. Second, if events
are accelerating, and yet only daily data is known, then eventually the true time interval
between fatal attacks will be a matter of hours or minutes, thereby rendering time-series
with strings of τn = 1 values useless. Imagine a situation where you are monitoring the
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time between a child’s meals – having a theory (e.g. probability distribution) rounded to an
integer number of days is rather pointless since it is a forgone conclusion that each day will
involve (at least) one meal. Third, Ref. [102]’s attempt to account for the entire duration
using a single analytic form, runs the risk of sacrificing improved accuracy and insight
during the practically important regime of initial escalation (i.e. small n). By focusing on
this escalation regime, we were able to use a far simpler analytic form than Ref. [102] and
hence were able to discover the remarkable linear dependencies shown in Fig. 2 and Ref.
[69], as well as developing a potentially powerful Red Queen theory which is not tied to
any specific mechanism (e.g. insurgent size). Instead, Ref. [102] forces the establishment
of a single analytic form to cover both the escalation regime with τn  1 and the steady-
state-like regime with τn ≈ 1. This is problematic, since a new conflict in its escalation
phase does not ‘know’ that it is approaching the data-resolution limit τn = 1, hence there
is no physical reason that its mathematical description should involve a smooth trajectory
through the τn = 1 resolution boundary. We also note that the occasional jumps that may
be observed in the time interval between successive fatal days (see for example, Fig. 3) might
be interpreted as systematic disruptions by Red or Blue on successive days (e.g. breaking
the daily routine) as opposed to being measurement error or background fluctuations. Such
jumps may arise for any number of reasons including (but not limited to) changes in the
number of insurgents or cells, and may even act like memory resets to the process. It is
these jumps that we believe could yield valuable insight into the effects of hidden changes
in the operating landscape on both sides of a conflict, either in real or cyber space. We will
return to this in future work.
Reference [102] presents additional false criticisms of Ref. [69]. For example, it claims
that we use learning to explain the progress-curve escalations. This is not true – there is
no such statement in Ref. [69]. On the contrary, we state explicitly in Ref. [69] that ‘Our
broad-brush theory does not require knowledge of specific adaptation or counteradaptation
mechanisms, and hence bypasses issues such as changes in insurgent membership, technology,
learning, or skill set, as well as a need to know the hearts and minds of local residents.’ We
also state in Ref. [69] that ‘We do not need to know exactly why R changes at any specific
moment, nor do the changes in R have to have the same value, because each change is the net
result of a mix of factors’. Indeed, we purposely chose the term ‘progress curve’ to avoid any
explicit connection to learning. As we acknowledge in Ref. [69], progress can arise for many
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different reasons (including, but not limited to, increases in insurgent numbers). Neither our
Red Queen theory nor our results depend on learning, nor do they rely on restricting the
scope of possible driving mechanisms. Insurgent size increase, as promoted in Ref. [102],
is simply one of the many specific mechanisms that can increase the Red Queen’s lead R
and hence escalate fatal attacks. As Ref. [69] states, the power of our Red Queen theory as
opposed to a specific, yet unjustified, mechanism such as insurgent size increase, is that it
is not tied to one particular narrative. It properly allows for combinations of mechanisms
which may change over time. Indeed, the claim in Ref. [102] that organizational growth
drives the escalation, is highly problematic in terms of verification. No data exists – nor
will any ever likely exist – for reliable insurgent numbers within the individual provinces
throughout the entire duration of our study. A similar story holds for other insurgent
wars and terrorism [102]. In particular, estimates of entire organizational size (e.g. the
total number of Taliban) are extremely crude at best, and may in fact be misleading – in
particular, it is unclear whether they bear any relationship to the actual number of active
members who are ready to carry out attacks at a particular moment in time.
The explicit explanation of escalation suggested by Ref. [102], invokes a change in the size
of the organization. However, earlier in 2009, Ref. [70] had already introduced a detailed
model (summarized below and in Figs. 7 and 8) in which the number of active cells Ng (i.e.
semi-autonomous groups [70]) can increase or decrease over time. We had then used this
to explain the change in the daily frequency distribution of fatal attacks on civilians etc.
aggregated at the level of a country (see Fig. 5). This model [70] provides a quantitative
explanation of the temporal evolution of several conflicts in terms of an increase (decrease) in
the total number of insurgent groups (i.e. cells) over time and an effective lowering of the bar
for carrying out successful attacks. This finding [70] reinforces our argument above against
size driving escalation, in that it is not enough to just focus on the changing number of cells
(or total number of insurgents). For a detailed discussion, see the online Supplementary
Information of Ref. [70], with results in Supplementary Table 2, and explicit model flow-
chart in Supplementary Figure 5. Even the basic one-population version of our model (see
Appendix A) can have the number of agents increasing, or more generally changing, over
time without affecting the appearance of an approximate power-law distribution with slope
near 2.5 (Fig. 6). Going further, the following simple argument reinforces our claim that
organizational growth cannot be the sole driver of the escalation patterns that we observe
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in Fig. 3. Suppose at time t, insurgents (or terrorists) have a strength NR(t) while coalition
troops (or a counterterrorism force) have strength NB(t), where ‘strength’ might involve
many factors, but for simplicity we take it to be the number of agents on each side. When
NB(t) ≈ 0 (which can arise temporarily in some provinces as troops get shifted around) the
rate of fatal attacks on coalition military will, by definition, be essentially zero, irrespective
of the size of NR(t). Even if NB(t)  1, there will also be essentially zero fatal attacks if
these coalition military never go out on patrol. Hence a blanket statement that insurgent
size dictates escalation is wrong. Suppose instead one tries setting the rate of fatal attacks
– taken to be proportional to the Red Queen’s lead – as R(t) = k(NR(t) − NB(t)) where
k is some conflict-specific constant. One can trivially see that increasing the size NR does
not guarantee an increase in R and hence attack frequency, because NB may also change.
Similar conclusions hold for other functional forms, since the generation of Blue fatalities
requires by necessity some kind of NB(t) dependence. Hence even before extra complications
such as changes in tactics or equipment on either side etc. are added, one can see that a
theory based solely on NR(t) is not plausible.
We also flag the incorrect discussion in Ref. [102] concerning our model’s ability to
account for the lack of a strong empirical relationship between the severity of individual
attacks and the escalation in the number of attacks [102]. Our full model (Fig. 8) does not
in fact contradict this finding. We had already shown that the best-fit power-law exponent
does not change much over successive epochs [76, 81, 89, 90] even though the frequency
distribution for the number of events per day is changing (Fig. 5) [70]. Turning to the basic
one-population version, the severity of an attack is given by the size of the cell deciding
to perform the attack, while the size of the entire insurgent or terrorist organization is
given by N(t). Figure 7 shows an example where prior to fragmentation of the cell of size
3 into 3 cells of size 1, N(t) is partitioned in such a way that ns=1(t) = 0, ns=2(t) = 1,
ns=3(t) = 2, ns=4(t) = 0, ns=5(t) = 1, ns≥6(t) = 0. The total size is N(t) =
∑
s ns(t) =
1×2 + 2×3 + 1×5 = 13, and the number of cells Ng(t) = 4. After fragmentation of the cell
of size 3 into 3 cells of size 1, N(t) = 13 still, but now Ng(t) = 6 and we have ns=1(t) = 3,
ns=2(t) = 1, ns=3(t) = 1, ns=4(t) = 0, ns=5(t) = 1, ns≥6(t) = 0. Hence the actual values of
N(t), Ng(t) and ns(t) (the number of cells with size s) can show appreciable variability from
each other at any particular moment in time. In passing, we note the interesting feature
(see Appendix A) that the actual functional form of the cell size distribution of individual
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cells {ns(t)}, where ns(t) is the number of cells of strength s at time t, does not depend on
N(t).
Finally, we mention for clarification that our escalation study in Ref. [69] looked at the
deterministic (power-law) trend of the sequence of time intervals. We did not look at a
statistical distribution of time intervals, nor did we analyze power law distributions – nor
does Ref. [69] claim that the time intervals are described by a power-law distribution. There
is a fundamental difference between describing a deterministic overall trend in successive time
intervals as the conflict evolves – which is what we did for each province – and describing the
statistical distribution of the ensemble of time intervals for each province. Since the conflict
is non-stationary, and shows escalation, it would make little sense to aggregate all the time
intervals and look for a single distribution. This would ignore completely the underlying
dynamical trend, and could lead to quite misleading conclusions. For example, the few
large τn values during the early stages of the conflict would tend to dominate any statistical
analysis of fat-tailed behavior, giving a distribution measure which is unrepresentative of
the entire conflict. On another point related to statistics, and specifically returning to
the conventional unweighted linear least-squares approach which we used in Ref. [69] to
detect the trend in logτn versus logn, it is well-known that this method will become very
accurate in the limit that the residuals of logτn approach statistical independence with
identical distributions (i.i.d.). This i.i.d. criterion is not strictly met in many applications
of least-squares in the sciences, however it turns out to be a good approximation in our
study [69] and likewise in Figs. 2 and 3. This is because the error in the underlying τn
values has a crudely multiplicative form whose effect decreases with increasing n. There are
many reasons why such a scatter should occur: Insurgent attacks early in the conflict may
stop short of wanting to cause coalition military deaths for fear of stimulating an increased
future troop presence, thereby producing large variations in τn values for small n. Also,
there were physically less coalition soldiers (i.e. targets) on the ground, so their fatalities
may have been more clustered. Because of the subsequent transformation to logarithmic
variables, the resulting residuals for logτn versus logn will then have distributions which are
reasonably insensitive to increasing n. It also turns out that these residuals have a fairly
small autocorrelation, a fact that can also be seen crudely by eye simply by looking at the
scatter of logτn values. The net result is that the residuals of logτn exhibit a distribution
which is fairly insensitive to n and they also have very little autocorrelation – in short, the
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residuals are approximately i.i.d. as indeed they should be.
IV. ATTACK TIMING: NON-POISSON DISTRIBUTION
Figure 5 reproduces a result from Ref. [70], in which we showed that the empirical data
for the timing of attacks generates non-Poissonian distributions. In line with the above
discussion, the non-Poisson nature of the distribution for the number of attacks on a given
day of an ongoing conflict, tends to increase as the conflict evolves over time. Figure 5 also
demonstrates a common burstiness in the distribution for the number of attacks per day.
As explained in the Methods and Supplementary Information of Ref. [70], we compare the
distributions over daily event counts for different epochs within four modern conflicts, against
control distributions (random war) obtained by randomizing event occurrences within each
epoch. The data for each conflict (green circles) deviate from its random war (dashed curve)
in a similar way: the real war exhibits an overabundance of light days (i.e. days with
few attacks) and of heavy days (i.e. days with many attacks), but a lack of medium days
compared with the random war (see lower panel of Fig. 5). By considering subsets of days,
we determined that these features are not just an artefact of a variation in attack volume
across days of the week (for example, Fridays). The burstiness became more pronounced
over time for the wars in both Iraq and Colombia, suggesting that they became less random
as they evolved. We checked that these findings are insensitive to the precise specification
of the epochs within a given conflict.
V. SEVERITY: POWER-LAWS AND BEYOND
As mentioned earlier, Refs. [89, 90] showed that the distributions for the severity of
attacks (i.e. the histogram of the number of events with x casualties, as a function of x)
generates surprisingly broad and common distributions. These distributions approximate to
a power law – or strictly speaking, a power-law cannot be rejected – and have a corresponding
power-law exponent around 2.5. However in Ref. [70], we looked at features beyond a simple
power-law and found that additional information is contained in the deviations beyond the
strict power-law form. In particular, we generated successively more detailed models in
which populations of actors interacted over time, like an ecology, and the output of these
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interactions gave the casualty distributions. The good fit between these models and the
empirical deviations beyond power-law (see Fig. 6), offers new insight into subtle differences
in the rules-of-engagement for these conflicts.
VI. OUR MICROSCOPIC MODEL OF MULTI-ACTOR CONFLICT
There is much work across the disciplines on how groups interact, and how these groups
break and form in non-violent settings – for example, in social psychology for humans,
and evolutionary biology and zoology for animals, birds and fish. There is far less known
about how human groups’ joining and breaking processes change when they are operating
in a clandestine and/or illicit way such that they do not want to get caught, and also
where they may have an underlying mistrust of each other which changes over time [4–6].
However, clues can be gathered from a number of related areas, including animal anti-
predator behaviors [17, 40] and also from the study of criminal gangs [4, 6, 99]. All these
works – in addition to journalistic reports for situations as diverse as violence in Colombia,
Iraq and Afghanistan, through to the recent riots in London – point to the idea that there
are many actors involved, and they form loose, ethereal groups which are hard to detect
and whose internal structure is either continually in flux or changes sporadically. These
features inspire the relatively few, yet entirely reasonable, mechanisms that we adopt in Fig.
8 in order to define a mechanistic model: namely, coalescence and fragmentation for the
cell dynamics, and bounded rationality in the decision-making for the cell attack decisions.
Indeed, the fact that there is only weak correlation between the severity of events and their
timing, further supports the idea that the severity and timing mechanisms can be crudely
thought of as independent processes, to a zeroth order approximation.
In Ref. [70], we presented a full model which reproduces the entire severity distribution
across various insurgent conflicts (green curves in Fig. 6). In this full model, Red and
Blue interact and fatalities are inflicted in Red, Blue and Green. Our results show that to
fully understand the richness of the severity distribution, and in particular to understand
the deviations from power-law, the role of Red, Blue and Green must be accounted for.
Doing so yields remarkably good agreement with the empirical data over the entire distri-
bution (green curves in Fig. 6). However if one is simply looking for an explanation of
the approximate power-law behavior of the distribution’s tail, and the apparent ubiquity of
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power-law exponents for casualties in the region of 2.5 for both insurgencies and terrorism,
we also showed [70] that a simple, one-population version of our model will suffice (see Fig.
7). Appendix A gives an explicit derivation for the resulting distribution of Red cell sizes
{ns(t)}. Assuming that a given insurgent cell inflicts damage proportional to its size when
it attacks, the empirical observation is reproduced concerning the approximate power-law
for casualties with exponent near 2.5.
Our full model [70] (Fig. 8) combines two key human behavioral features:
(1) Bounded rationality in the decision-making process of a cell when it is deciding whether
to attack on a given day. As in the famous ‘El Farol’ bar problem [68, 93], the cells are
limited by the information they have available to them, and the time they have to make their
decisions. In the ‘El Farol’ bar problem [68, 93], a collection of boundedly rational agents
are each deciding whether to attend a potentially overcrowded bar, and hence are deciding
whether today is a good day to compete for the limited seating space. In the case of the
insurgent cells, they are each deciding whether today is a good day to attack – the limited
resource that they are competing for could be space in the international news headlines. This
interpretation is consistent with the behavioral feature of insurgents noted by former U.S.
Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser David Kilcullen [107] that when insurgents ambush an
American convoy in Iraq: “...they’re not doing that because they want to reduce the number
of Humvees we have in Iraq by one. They’re doing it because they want spectacular media
footage of a burning Humvee.” It is also consistent with small-scale laboratory experiments
studying human groups [93]. Further support for this feature of boundedly rational decision-
making, is provided by Kenney [6]: “participants in trafficking networks are only what
Herbert Simon calls boundedly rational: they face significant computational limitations in
their ability to analyze feedback from incoming stimuli”.
(2) Fragile dynamical clustering within an insurgent population (e.g. as a result of internal
interactions and/or the presence of an opposing entity such as a state army), just as schools of
fish or animals will go through cycles of build up and then rapid dispersal when a predator
approaches [4–6, 17, 40]. The coalescence-fragmentation process (see Figs. 6 and 7) is
consistent with current notions of modern insurgencies as fragmented, transient, and evolving
[3, 5, 14, 20, 107]. We recall the phrase of Gambetta [4] “.... contrary to widespread
belief, criminal groups are unstable.” Further support is again provided by Kenney [6] in
From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies,
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and Competitive Adaptation: “To protect themselves from the police, trafficking enterprises
often compartment their participants into loosely coupled networks and limit communication
between nodes”; “Trafficking networks . . . . are light on their feet. They are smaller and
organizationally flatter”; “In progressive-era New York, according to historian Alan Block,
cocaine trafficking was organized by different networks of criminal entrepeneurs who formed,
reformed, split, and came together again as opportunity arose and when they were able”;
“loose collection of cells containing relatively small number of cell workers”; “Abu Sayyaf
. . operates as a decentralized network of loosely coupled groups that conduct bombings,
kidnappings, assassinations, and other acts of political violence in pursuit of a common goal
. . ”. Kenney also highlights the close connection of traffickers to terrorists: “Al Qaeda
share numerous similarities with drug-trafficking enterprises” [6].
The coalescence process mimics the situation in which two cells (or individuals in these
cells) initiate a communications link between them of arbitrary range (for example, a mobile
phone call), and hence the two cells tend to coordinate their actions from then on – albeit
maybe loosely. Indeed, the individual agents need not know each other, or be physically
present in the same place. The long-range nature of the coupling makes it a reasonable
description for physical insurgencies and crime groups using modern communications in real
space, as well as cells acting in cyberspace – or any mix of the two [6]. Indeed, the language
of what is a cell and what is a group, and what is crime and what is insurgency, becomes
somewhat irrelevant since the mechanistic operational details are now very similar. Further
details are given in Ref. [70]. The fragmentation process (Fig. 6) may arise for a number of
social or situational reasons, from breakdown in trust within the cell [4] through to detection
of imminent danger [6, 40]. In addition to the quotes above concerning insurgent, drug and
criminal groups [6], it is well documented that groups of objects (e.g. animals, people) may
suddenly scatter in all directions (i.e. complete fragmentation) when its members sense
danger, simply out of fear [40] or in order to confuse a predator [40]. Or they may fragment
following a clash in which the cell perceives that it is losing (see Supplementary Information
in Ref. [70] and Refs. [73, 76] for a number of variants, all of which give similar empirical
distributions for the severity). Interactions are distance-independent as in Ref. [9] since we
are interested in systems where messages can be transmitted over arbitrary distances (e.g.
modern human communications). Bird calls and chimpanzee interactions in complex tree
canope structures can also mimic this setup, as may the increasingly longer-range awareness
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that arises in larger animal, fish, bird and insect groups [40]. Appendix A gives an illustration
of the type of mathematical analysis which is possible, for the basic version of our model,
stripped down to a simple form with no decision-making, and only one population – the Red
insurgency. Instead of having cells fragment when interacting with Blue, or when sensing
imminent danger, we simply assign a probability for them to fragment. The resulting model
yields an exponentially cutoff 2.5-exponent power-law for the distribution of group sizes.
Assuming that the civilian population is just some passive background that receives an
impact proportional to the strength of each cell when it acts, the distribution of civilian
casualties will also have this same distribution – which is indeed what is observed for a wide
range of insurgent conflicts and global terrorism, as reported in Ref. [70].
Reference [103] makes a claim that our coalescence-fragmentation model falls down on
the basis that an approximate power-law severity distribution exists from the outset of their
empirical dataset for each terrorist organization, and yet the coalescence-fragmentation pro-
cess surely needs some time to converge to its steady-state power-law distribution. However,
this claim is false. First, the N(t) initial members may be coalescing and fragmenting be-
fore any violent event is undertaken – indeed, there are many examples of underground
organizations and US-based militia who spend many years evolving without any noticeable
violent activity. No external event may be observed, but there is still a dynamical network
of groups evolving in the background. Most importantly, any such organization will un-
doubtedly already have several existing clusters of contacts, hence it is not the case that the
distribution has to build up from all isolated agents. Going further, it is well known that an
approximate power-law for group sizes with slope around 2.5, as produced by our model, is
to be expected with many different social and human activity scenarios – from the way peo-
ple organize themselves in markets [114], to commerce [116], through to more casual social
settings. A nascent insurgent, criminal, or cyber group could be created effectively instantly
from such an existing structure. Second, the numerical simulations show that the fat-tailed
distribution develops very quickly, even if we start with isolated agents. Third, it is not the
case that starting from day 1 of a given organization, all fatal events are recorded in the
database. There is no guarantee that the finite time-window database of Ref. [102], which
started nominally in 1968, either records correctly all events since 1968, or that it captures
the true first few events of each terrorist group. The way in which events are interpreted and
recorded has changed over time, and so in addition has the ability to name organizations
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– and indeed, so have their names changed in some cases, with merging and splinter group
formation fairly common. We also note that the alternative severity model proposed in Ref.
[104], is simply a combination of phenomenological broad-brush factors which happen to
give a power-law, but without any specific justification for yielding the observed exponent
value of 2.5. Instead, the parameters of this model [104] need to be cherry-picked in order
to obtain the observed power-law exponent value of 2.5. In reality, a continuum of values –
including values well away from 2.5 – are just as likely within the model [104]. Nor is there
any quantitative evidence to support their proposed underlying mechanism.
We note that we have also carried out preliminary investigations (and are now pursuing
rigorously) the addition of heterogeneity in terms of individual character, as in Fig. 1, and
its effects on team formation and kinship when both the individuals and cell are under stress.
We have already presented this work for gangs and online guilds for massively parallel human
activities involving online cyberwar games [75], as well as investigating the effect theoretically
in a preliminary way [73]. This published work successfully uses the addition of a scalar
character variable to describe the empirical datasets for Long Beach street gangs and World
of Warcraft online guilds. Enriching this structure, our preliminary work suggests that
the inclusion of agent character may cause mixing of these divisions and initiate extreme
behavior, depending on the strength of the kinship tendency (e.g. mimicking tribal and
ethnic tendencies). Eventually, we hope that a full character-version of our model will
provide a flexible tool which we can adapt to help address a number of issues concerning
social and cultural intervention schemes, such as ceasefires and peace plans, and pinpointing
social triggers that aggravate a given conflict.
Another criticism of Ref. [70] which has appeared in comments on the Internet, concerns
the nature of the ‘information’ that the cells have available to them in our generalized El
Farol model for cell decision-making [70]. As in the El Farol model itself, ‘information’
here simply means something which acts as a common cue – not necessarily a particular
media source (e.g. CNN) or even type of media. Indeed, we state in Ref. [70] that:
“Each group receives daily some common but limited information (for example, opposition
troop movements, a specific religious holiday, even a shift in weather patterns). The actual
content is relatively unimportant provided it becomes the primary input for the groups
decision-making process.” This common information acts as a coordinating effect. Even if
it is incorrect or inaccurate, it can still act to concentrate responses in a similar way. This
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crowding effect in strategy space is explained in detail, in the context of financial market
burstiness, in Ref. [68].
So far we have focused on reproducing the statistical stylized facts for insurgent conflicts
and terrorism. But given the development of a minimal model as described above and in
Fig. 7 and 8, we can also ask the practical question: Can we estimate how long a conflict
will last? To address this in a simple way, we make the assumption of applying the law
of pure attrition – or more precisely, that a conflict lasts as long as it takes to reduce one
side to a certain level of strength N(t). The result is shown in Fig. 9 and the details
are given in Ref. [72]. Our results show that a minority Red population experiences a
longer survival time against a majority Blue force, than it would in the case of two equally
balanced populations. This result is irrespective of whether the majority population adopts
such internal grouping or not. Adding a third population with pre-defined group sizes
allows the duration to be tailored. As shown, our findings compare favorably to real-world
observations. We stress that these findings are not a simple consequence of either dilution
leading to reaction slow-down, or of the specific cluster selection scheme that we chose. In
our model, as in nature, opposing predator groups actively seek each other out at each
timestep, even if their density is low, making this unlike simple chemical dilution, and hence
unlike simple mass-action equations. Instead, our results emerge from the interplay between
population asymmetry, the presence of clustering, and the intentional engagement between
the two opposing populations. Although the specific consequences may vary by application
area, we believe that related phenomena lying beyond mass-action predictions will arise in
a wide range of physical, chemical, biological and social systems, whenever intra-population
clustering coexists with inter-population reactions.
VII. SPREADING RUMORS AND MEMES IN AN INSURGENT POPULATION
We now turn to look at the effect of spreading of a meme, or idea, or doctrine, or
knowledge, within the Red population – in order to understand how such populations might
be persuaded and even infiltrated. This seems similar to an epidemic modeling problem, and
hence one might be tempted to use one of the many approaches already developed. However,
just as for models of conflict discussed earlier, dynamical models of spreading tend to fall
into one of two extremes [108], neither of which is particularly realistic for modern insurgent
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wars or terrorist activity – and even less so for online cyberterrorism and cyberattacks.
At one extreme, they assume that the social mixing dynamics are much faster than the
spreading process, and hence that mass-action models can be adopted in which a continuum
approximation can be used to generate differential equations based on calculus. This tends
to be the extreme favored by mathematicians and physicists and engineers, since it unlocks
the power of calculus and the vast spectrum of known properties of differential operators.
At the other extreme, is the limit which has been favored by the social science community,
in which the heterogeneity of social links is retained at the expense of assuming that the
social network is static on the timescale of spreading-related events. Many state-of-the-art
descriptions of viral transmission processes in real populations incorporate system-specific
details and considerations (e.g. spatial topology, differential susceptibility) [109–113]. As
indicated above, some of these focus on the well-mixed (i.e. mass-action) limit, some of
these focus on the limit of heterogeneous networks – and some attempt to move between
the two by adding patch-like structure to mass-action models, or dynamical link rewirings
to network models [112, 113].
Our model (Fig. 8) in which dynamical regroupings happen spontaneously and sporadi-
cally over time, allows us to focus on the spreading dynamics in the realistic but less well un-
derstood regime where the group-level dynamics and individual-level transmission processes
can evolve on the same timescale, and hence the number and identity of a given individual’s
contacts can change abruptly at any given moment in time. This is shown in Fig. 10 (see, for
example, (a) and (b)) and is explained in detail in Ref. [78]. Most importantly, the dynam-
ical processes of social group or cell formation/break-up and person-to-person transmission
of information, can co-exist on comparable timescales. We adopt the simple one-population
form of our model (Appendix A). By varying the probabilities of group coalescence (νcoal)
and fragmentation (νfrag) relative to the standard SIR (Susceptible→Infected→Recovered)
probabilities for person-to-person transmission (p) and individual recovery (q), the entire
range of relative timescales can be easily explored – from a very slowly changing insurgent
cell structure (i.e. essentially a static network with infrequent rewirings) through to a rapidly
changing cell structure (i.e. essentially a well-mixed population). Our model only has four
stochastic parameters for the probabilities (and hence timescales) of the individual level
transmission and cell dynamics, i.e. p, q for the SIR process, and νcoal and νfrag which de-
scribe the probability of cells coalescing or fragmenting (Appendix A). Reference [78] shows
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explicitly that it reproduces the qualitative shapes of a wide range of empirical profiles
associated with social, financial and biological spreading, simply by varying these relative
timescales. One implication of our findings is that conventional intelligence approaches in
which the connections and nodes are sought assuming some quasi-static network, are likely
to be unreliable at best – and dangerously wrong at worst – leading to misplaced analyses
and operations and possibly ultimately endangering Blue personnel. Fuller details of these
dynamical spreading results are given in Ref. [78].
VIII. OUTLOOK
Our modeling approach described here, is characterized by two stages: First, our broad-
brush dynamical Red Queen theory which describes the escalation between Red and Blue
[69]. This theory and analysis does not depend on the precise mechanism which changes the
Red Queen’s lead at any one time. Second, we provide a plausible microsocopic mechanistic
model which captures more of the complexity shown in Fig. 1, with interacting populations
comprising dynamically evolving cells in some loose and sporadically-changing structure.
This model accounts for both the stylized facts of the timing of events and their severity.
The parameters in our model are relatively few, and the model itself allows a range of
analytic mathematical analysis to be performed for both the severity [73] and the timing
[68]. Although simple and intuitive, the mechanisms incorporated in the model mimic
certain real-world human behavioral features, such as (i) human decision-making under
conditions of limited endogenous and exogenous information, (ii) the fragile and transitory
nature of criminal groups, (iii) confidence levels, and desire for success, (iv) punishment
and reward [92] via the way in which strategy scores are updated, and (v) the tendency
for human insurgents to occasionally coordinate actions using modern technology for long-
distance communications, e.g. mobile phone calls and Internet use. Adding in the aspect
of character to these models, which we are currently doing, will extend this work beyond
the current stage where individuals (e.g. insurgents) are just particles, and will allow us to
examine human social, cultural and behavioral issues such as reward-punishment payoffs for
cell members with different social and cultural backgrounds [92].
It may well turn out that other explanations of the stylized facts of human insurgency
are possible. In fact, we both hope and expect this will happen in the near future – just
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as the study of financial markets has spurred the fledgling field of Econophysics to become
so productive over the past decade [67]. As more stylized facts become available, the com-
peting theories can be judged against these benchmarks. It may also occur that, as in the
study of financial markets, certain types of stochastic time-series-generating process can also
reproduce the observed statistical features – however, just as in the financial market field, it
is well recognized that no deep understanding of market dynamics is offered by such models,
other than the ability to replicate similar statistical patterns. By contrast, our goal is to
deliver a model which is based on reasonable mechanisms of the dynamics of insurgencies at
the cell level, with fairly minimal assumptions, and hence open up the path to a wide range
of uses (e.g. scenario testing, evaluation of different strategies, interpretation of the change
in a war through a surge etc.).
We now comment on the comparison to cybergangs and street gangs. We found that
when we analyzed the empirical distributions for Long Beach street gang sizes and online
guild sizes for World of Warcraft [75], the empirical distributions were not power-law like.
This can be explained by the fact that our data comprised the actual membership of online
guilds and gangs, as well as street gangs, as opposed to the number of objects who happen
to be coordinated (e.g. online, or on the street) at any one time. The latter is likely to vary
rapidly and spontaneously every day as members come online or onto the street, however the
underlying membership would be expected to change more slowly over timescales of months.
In addition, when individuals leave a street gang or an online guild, it is unlikely that this
happens because the entire gang or guild is disbanding – hence the fragmentation process
in our model is less realistic. Indeed, it is known that fission processes involving the partial
dismantling of a large cell into just a few randomly chosen splinter-cells tends to generate
non-power-law distributions, as is observed for street gangs and online guilds [75]. In short,
the rules for the coalescence-fragmentation in street gangs and guilds are likely to change
when one considers longer-term membership, as compared to Figs. 7 and 8. In this case,
we believe that the role of individual character will come more to the fore. This is indeed
exactly what we found in Ref. [78] – by adding character, in addition to some simple rules
based on team formation, we found that we could reproduce the size distribution results for
both cyber gangs and also street gangs on the monthly scale.
This study could be opened up to other forms of collective human predation, such as
the sinister threat from online child pornography rings. Even non-human predation can be
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considered, such as ‘battles’ involving populations of pathogens within the immune system,
or even the analogy to insurgency where parts of the immune system attack itself – and
where normal cells turn cancerous, generating primary tumors as well as secondary spreading
through metastasis [117]. One particular example for which there is a wealth of data for
collective human predation, is a financial market. In the fast, high-frequency regime of
intraday trading, predatory algorithms can dominate the market at particular instances.
Furthermore, they operate across multiple markets on the scale of hundreds, or event tens, of
milliseconds, without regard for geographical boundaries. This connection between markets
and predation may run even deeper, given the fact that many causes and drivers of social
unrest may ultimately be linked to individual wealth and hence to the dynamics of the
markets. Indeed, the lead article on the front page of the New York Times on Friday, July
18, 2008, featured what looked like a typical picture of insurgent activity, but noted below
that the cause was actually the successive plunges in the Pakistan stock market over a two
week period. This new area of coupled societal risks represents a huge future modeling
challenge.
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Appendix A
Here we consider the basic version of our model, stripped down to a simple form with
no decision-making, and only one population – the Red insurgency. Instead of having cells
fragment when interacting with Blue, or when sensing imminent danger, we simply assign
a probability for them to fragment. The resulting model yields an exponentially cutoff
2.5-exponent power-law for the distribution of cell sizes. We note that generalizations of
this model have appeared in the literature – in particular, Ref. [73] contains a number of
relevant generalizations, including a variable number of agents in time N(t). A later paper
provides a different derivation of the same basic result as the one below [105], reaching similar
conclusions to our earlier publication (Ref. [73]) concerning the remarkable robustness of
the 2.5 exponent to variations in the model mechanisms.
Assuming that the civilian population is just some passive background that absorbs the
strength of each cell when that cell acts, the distribution of civilian casualties should have
a similar distribution to that of the insurgent cells (see main text for a fuller discussion of
this point). Analysis of a simple version of this model was completed earlier by d’Hulst
and Rodgers [8], and real-world applications have focused on financial markets – however
the derivation below features general values νfrag and νcoal. At each timestep, the internal
coherence of a population of N objects (which we refer to as an ‘agents’ to acknowledge
application to human and/or cyber systems) comprises a heterogenous soup of cells. Within
each cell, the component objects have a strong intra-cell coherence. Between cells, the inter-
cell coherence is weak. An agent i is then picked at random – or equivalently, a cell is
randomly selected with probability proportional to size. Let si be the size of the cell to
which this agent belongs. With probability νfrag, the coherence of a given cell fragments
completely into si cells of size one. If it doesn’t fragment, a second cell is randomly selected
with probability again proportional to size – or equivalently, another agent j is picked at
random. With probability νcoal, the two cells then coalesce (or develop a common ‘coherence’
in terms of their thinking or activities). As discussed in the main text, Kenney provides a
wealth of case-study support for thinking of an insurgency as a loose soup of fragile cells [6],
as do Gambetta [4] and Robb [5].
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The Master Equation is as follows:
∂ns
∂t
=
νcoal
N2
s−1∑
k=1
knk(s− k)ns−k − νfragsns
N
− 2νcoalsns
N2
∞∑
k=1
knk , s ≥ 2 , (A1)
∂n1
∂t
=
νfrag
N
∞∑
k=2
k2nk − 2νcoaln1
N2
∞∑
k=1
knk . (A2)
Note here we make an approximation that N → ∞. The terms on the right hand side of
Eq. (A1) represent all the ways in which ns can change. In the equilibrium state:
sns =
1− νfrag
(νfrag + 2νcoal)N
s−1∑
k=1
knk(s− k)ns−k , s ≥ 2 , (A3)
n1 =
νfrag
2(1− νfrag)
∞∑
k=2
k2nk . (A4)
Consider
G[y] =
∞∑
k=0
knky
k = n1y +
∞∑
k=2
knky
k ≡ n1y + g[y] , (A5)
where y is a parameter and g[y] governs the cell size distribution nk for k ≥ 2. Multiplying
Eq. (A3) by ys and then summing over s from 2 to ∞, yields:
g[y] =
1− νfrag
(νfrag + 2νcoal)N
G[y] , (A6)
i.e.
g[y]2 −
(
νfrag − 2νcoal
νcoal
N − 2n1y
)
g[y] + n21y
2 = 0 . (A7)
From Eq. (A5), g[1] = G[1]− n1. Substituting this into Eq. (A7) and setting y = 1, we can
solve for g[1]
g[1] =
νcoal
νfrag + 2νcoal
N . (A8)
Hence
n1 = N − g[1] = νfrag + νcoal
νfrag + 2νcoal
N . (A9)
Substituting this into Eq. (A7) yields
g[y]2 −
(
νfrag + 2νcoal
νcoal
N − 2N(νfrag + νcoal)
νfrag + 2νcoal
y
)
g[y] +
(N(νfrag + νcoal))
2
(νfrag + 2νcoal)2
y2 = 0 . (A10)
We can solve this quadratic for g[y]
g[y] =
(νfrag + 2νcoal)N
4νcoal
2− 4(νfrag + νcoal)νcoal
(νfrag + 2νcoal)2
y − 2
√√√√1− 4(νfrag + νcoal)νcoal
(νfrag + 2νfrag)2
y
 , (A11)
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which can be easily expanded
g[y] =
(νfrag + 2νcoal)N
2νcoal
∞∑
k=2
(2k − 3)!!
(2k)!!
(
4(νfrag + νcoal)νcoal
(νfrag + 2νcoal)2
y
)k
. (A12)
Comparing with the definition of g[y] in Eq. (A5) shows that
ns =
νfrag + 2νcoal
2νcoal
(2s− 3)!!
s(2s)!!
(
4(νfrag + νcoal)νcoal
(νfrag + 2νcoal)2
)s
. (A13)
We now employ Stirling’s series
ln[s!] =
1
2
ln[2pi] +
(
s+
1
2
)
ln[s]− s+ 1
12s
− ... . (A14)
Hence for s ≥ 2, we find
ns ≈
(
(νfrag + 2νcoal)e
2
23/2
√
2piνcoal
)(
4(νfrag + νcoal)νcoal
(νfrag + 2νcoal)2
)s
(s− 1)2s−3/2
s2s+1
N , (A15)
which implies that
ns ∼
(
νs−1coal (νfrag + νcoal)
s
(νfrag + 2νcoal)2s−1
)
s−5/2 . (A16)
In the limit s 1, this is formally equivalent to saying that
ns ∼ exp(−s/s0)s−5/2 (A17)
where
s0 = −
[
ln
(
4(νfrag + νcoal)νcoal
(νfrag + 2νcoal)2
)]−1
. (A18)
For large cell sizes (i.e. large s such that s ∼ O(N)) the power law behaviour is masked by
the exponential function. The equilibrium state for the distribution of cell sizes can therefore
be considered a power-law with exponent α ∼ 5/2 = 2.5, together with an exponential cut-
off. In the human context, the fact that the interactions are effectively distance-independent
as far as Eq. (A1) is concerned, captures the fact that we wish to model systems where
messages can be transmitted over arbitrary distances (e.g. modern human communications).
Bird calls and chimpanzee interactions in complex tree canopy structures can also mimic
this setup, as may the increasingly longer-range awareness that arises in larger animal, fish,
bird and insect groups. In a human/biological context, a justification for choosing a cell with
a probability which is proportional to its size, is as follows: a cell with more members has
more chances of initiating an event. It will also be more likely to find members of another
cell more frequently, and hence be able to synchronize with them – thereby synchronizing
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the two cells. It is well documented that cells of living objects (e.g. animals, people) may
suddenly scatter in all directions (i.e. complete fragmentation as in Eq. (A1)) when its
members sense danger, simply out of fear or in order to confuse a predator. Such fleeing
behavior was discussed at length in the classic 1970 work ‘Protean Defence by Prey Animals’
by D. A. Humphries and P.M. Driver, Oecologia (Berl.) 5, 285-302 (1970).
This model also offers an alternative explanation for a variety of other complex phenomena
which have been found to exhibit a robust 2.5 power-law. Gabaix et al. [114] found a common
power-law distribution for individual transaction sizes with α = 2.5 ± 0.1, for the London
Stock Exchange, the NYSE, and the Paris Bourse. Interpreting N as the average aggregate
demand for stocks, this demand N gets shaped into a distribution of demand ‘clusters’
representing potential orders of a given size s. Since it is reasonable to expect orders to
be realized at random, the distribution of individual transaction sizes is proportional to
the distribution of clusters of potential orders – hence α = 2.5. Similarly, Richardson [18]
concluded that the distribution of approximately 103 gangs in Chicago, and in Manchoukuo
in 1935, separately followed a truncated power-law with α ≈ 2.3. Interpreting N as the
number of potential gang members in each case, with each comprising a transient soup of
clusters which tend to combine or fragment over time, yields α = 2.5. In a similar way, the
robust time-dependence of a power-law with α ≈ 2.4 in a recent New York garment industry
study [116] can be reinterpreted as a repartitioning of trading interactions, with multi-
component clusters continually being built up as part of common jobs (i.e. coalescence)
and then dissolving upon completion (i.e. fragmentation). For collections of N neurons
[115], we can imagine a dynamical coalescence-fragmentation grouping process in which
groups of neurons become synchronized, and then this synchronization ultimately fragments.
(Members of the same group need not be physically adjacent to each other). When an
entire group fires, it creates a measurable activity equal to [115] the group size s. Hence the
resulting activity distribution will follow a new power-law given by s× p(s). The resulting
power-law exponent (α − 1) = 1.5, which is exactly the famous empirical 3/2 value [115].
We note that although competing theories exist for many of these applications (i.e. Chialvo
[115] for neural dynamics and Gabaix et al. [114] for markets), we know of no other single
mechanism which is simultaneously physically plausible for each application area and which
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can also explain a mysterious recent finding in the field of superconductivity [74].
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FIG. 4: (Color online) From Ref. [69], our dynamic Red Queen model for the Red-Blue struggle.
Red (e.g. insurgent) advantage R is represented as a vector in a multi-dimensional space whose
axes may represent technological, psychological, social, cultural or behavioral factors. R follows a
stochastic walk in this D-dimensional space. Using known results from statistical physics, exact
results can be obtained for b under different conditions of correlation etc. within the walk. For
the simplest case of an uncorrelated walk, b = 0.5. For a completely correlated walk in D = 1
dimensions (i.e. linear feedback), b = 1. For a mean-reverting walk in D = 1 dimensions, b ≈ 0.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) From Ref. [70], the distribution of the number of violent events per day in
a given conflict. Green circles show the distribution p(n) for the number of days with n events in
the actual conflict. Histograms below represent differences D(n) between real and random wars,
in units of standard deviations from the mean. The average values for random wars (i.e. where
actual data is randomized over finite time window) are shown as dashed lines. Solid lines denote
average distributions calculated from 10,000 realizations of our model. This model is a generalized
version of the El Farol model: Individual cells only act if they possess strategies with sufficient past
success, and hence the cell surpasses a minumum confidence level [68, 70]. Error bars for random
wars, calculated as one standard deviation from the mean of 10,000 shufflings, are shown but they
are small. The error bars for the model wars demonstrate a small spread in run outcomes.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) From Ref. [70], the log–log plot of the complementary cumulative distri-
bution of event size P (X ≥ x) (i.e. the probability of an event of size greater than or equal to x)
for four conflicts. Horizontal axis shows event size x, namely the number of casualties. Solid green
curves show the results from our model. Blue dashed line is a straight line guide to the eye, not
a power-law fit. As also shown in Ref. [70], the hypothesis that these quasi-straight-line graphs
follow a power-law cannot be rejected. The exponents for the underlying best-fit power-laws, all
have values near 2.5. This can be explained using a simple, one-population version of our model
(see Appendix A), assuming that a given insurgent cell inflicts damage proportional to its size when
it attacks. However, to fully understand the richness of the full distribution, and in particular to
understand the deviations from power-law, the activity of the other actors (i.e. state military,
police or civilians) must be accounted for. Doing this yields remarkably good agreement with the
empirical data (green curves) [70].
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Population could be a real world insurgency, terrorist group, criminal gang, Internet/
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FIG. 7: (Color online) From Ref. [70], the insurgent population comprises an overall strength N(t),
distributed into dynamically evolving cells – with time-varying size, number and composition, and
with diverse strengths at each time-step t. The total number of cells Ng(t) at time t can vary
with time, as can the total number of composite objects (i.e. insurgent members, equipment,
information) N(t). Since Ng(t) is the number of cells, and N(t) is the total number of objects
(e.g. insurgents) these two quantities are fairly independent with the only constraint being that
Ng(t) ≥ 1 (i.e. the smallest number of cells is when every object belongs to this same cell) and
Ng(t) ≤ N(t) (i.e. the largest number of cells is when every object is isolated). In this example
shown, the number of cells of a given size s at this timestep t, prior to fragmentation of the cell
of size 3 into 3 cells of size 1, is ns=1(t) = 0, ns=2(t) = 1, ns=3(t) = 2, ns=4(t) = 0, ns=5(t) = 1,
ns≥6(t) = 0. The total number of insurgents is N(t) =
∑
s ns(t) = 1× 2 + 2× 3 + 1× 5 = 13. The
number of cells Ng(t) = 4. After fragmentation, N(t) = 13 still, but now Ng(t) = 6.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) From Ref. [70], our full model describing the attack severity distribution
and attack timings comprises two main processes: (1) The interaction between Red (e.g. insurgent
force, shown here in black) of size N(t) and Blue (e.g. coalition military, not shown) and Green
(e.g. civilian population, not shown) which then generates the severity distribution for casualties
per event. As a result of these interactions, the insurgent force of size N(t) undergoes an ongoing
process of coalescence and fragmentation. (2) A repeated decision process in which each of the
individual Ng(t) cells which exist at time t, assess whether to attack or not based on the information
and resources it has available to it. This is a two-step process: First the cell will either be potentially
active or not [70] based on its confidence level (e.g. based on the performance of of their strategies
in the past). Then if active, it will decide whether to specifically attack at that timestep or hold
off momentarily. The fact that the severity of events and their timing show a low correlation in our
datasets, is reflected in the fact that Ng(t) and N(t) can vary almost independently, with the only
constraint being that Ng(t) ≥ 1 (i.e. the smallest number of cells is when every object belongs to
this same cell) and Ng(t) ≤ N(t) (i.e. the smallest number of cells is when every object belongs
to this same cell). In this example, the number of cells of a given size s at this timestep t is
ns=1(t) = 6, ns=2(t) = 2, ns=3(t) = 3, ns=4−6(t) = 0, ns=7(t) = 1, ns≥8(t) = 0. The total number
of insurgents is therefore N(t) = 26. The number of cells Ng(t) = 12.
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FIG. 9: (Color online) From Ref. [72], our model gives an estimate of the duration of a conflict.
Duration T of human conflicts, as function of asymmetry x between the two opposing populations
A and B. x = |NA(0) − NB(0)|/[NA(0) + NB(0)]. Data are up to the end of 2008, hence final
datapoints for the three ongoing wars will lie above positions shown, as indicated by arrows. Lower
two blue lines are the mass-action results.
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FIG. 10: (Color online) From Ref. [78], the process of transmission through a population com-
prising a loose soup of cells (groups) which follow our model’s simple dynamical rules for growth
and break-up. a: Schematic of dynamical grouping of insurgents on the Internet, or Facebook
etc. b: Schematic of our model, featuring spreading in the presence of dynamical grouping via
coalescence and fragmentation. Vertical axis shows number of cells (groups) of a given size at time
t. c: Instantaneous network from Fig. 10b at each timestep. d: Weighted network obtained by
aggregating links over time-window T .
52
